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Degree in Moral Theology at St. John's Seminary in Boston. 
In 1978 the birth of Loui se Brown, the world ' s first test-tube baby, 
captured worldwide attention. Over the past 20 years, the use of in vitro 
fertili zation ( IY F) has increased rapidly. By 1994, approx imately 3 1,000 
babies had been born in the United States after fertili zation in vitro .1 
Thi s paper begins with a description of IYF as it is practiced today. 
The Church' s teaching on IY F is then bri efl y rev iewed, followed by an 
overview of arguments used to support IYF. A final section examines 
some of the untoward consequences of IYF which are often ignored by its 
proponents. 
The Procedure 
IY F normally begins with hyperstimulation of the ovaries of an 
inferti Ie woman (or an egg donor) by a series of drug and hormone 
inj ections to mature multiple eggs within her ovary. ;\t the end of thi s 
period, the eggs are harvested, usually by insertion of a hollow needle 
th rough the vaginal wall to the ovary. Nationwide, the average number of 
eggs retrieved is about 12 per cyc le.2 
The sperm for IY F are usually obtained from the woman' s partner or 
a sperm donor by masturbation and then capac itated for fertili zation. 
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Sperm and eggs are placed together in a culture medium to achieve 
fe rtili zation, and the resulting embryos a re grown fo r about 40 ho urs prior 
to trans fera l to the woman's ute rus. 
In cases o f male infe rtility, the sperm may need some he lp to 
penetrate the egg. O ne way of c ircumventing thi s diffi culty is to modify 
the zona pe lluc ida or parti a lly di ssecting it. A second so lution is intra-
cytoplasmic sperm inj ectio n ( ICS I). In ICS I, penetrat ion of the egg by the 
sperm is simply bypassed ; a s ing le sperm is d irectly inj ected into the 
inte rior of the egg. As in o ther in vitro methods, embryos are cultured 
brie fl y prior to re in sert ion. 
After the culture pe riod, embryos a re graded based on the ir shape and 
how we ll the ir ce ll s a re di vid ing. To increase the chances of a successful 
pregnancy, abo ut four of the hea lthi est embryos a re trans ferred to the 
ute rus o f the bio logica l mother or surrogate. A study o f 267 I VF program s 
in the US and Canada revea led a c linical pregnancy rate of 19.8% per 
cyc le, w ith a de livery rate o f 16 .0% per cycle. ' A Be lg ian group has 
reported comparable rates of success fo r ICS I.4 
Church Teaching on IYF and Related Procedures 
Fundamenta l to any unde rstand ing of the Catho l ic Church' s teaching 
on IV F is that procreation is exact ly that : pro-creation . T he transmi ss ion 
of life is an area in whi ch man cooperates w ith God in the c reation o f new 
life; it is not an area over which God has g iven ma n unlimited dominion. 
The di gn ity o f procrea ti on lies in the fact that man cooperates w ith God in 
God 's c reation of a new human be ing, fo r w hom God will s ete rn a l life. 
" Human procreation requires o n the pa rt of thc spouses responsible 
co llaboration w ith the fruit ful love of God.") 
Such co llaboration in vo lves respect fo r the na ture of the conjugal act 
as God has authored it. Pope Paul V I" s encyc l ica l Humanae Vitae rema in s 
the key source fo r understand ing the nature of thi s act. T hi s encyc lica l 
po ints o ut the " inseparable connecti on, w illed by God and unabl e to be 
bro ken by man on hi s own initiati ve, between the two meanings of the 
conjuga l act: the unitive meaning and the procreati ve meaning .. ·6 
O f itse lf, this statement is not quitc suffi c ient to establi sh the 
immora li ty o f IV F. For one could a rgue, as does William Dani e l. S.J. , that 
a ll we learn from Humanae Vi/(le is that whe n the conjuga l union is 
present, it must be both uniti ve and ordered to procreatio n. In the case of 
IV F, however, the re is no act of conjuga l un ion , and thus, it could be 
a rgued, no question of separating its two meanings .7 
To clari fy matters, it is necessary to read Humanae Vitae together 
w ith Doman Vitae, the 1988 document from the Sacred Congregation for 
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the Doctrine of the Faith which addre sed IY F directly. In this statement, 
the Congregation states that not only are the procreative and unitive 
meanings of the conjuga l act inseparable, but procreation is inseparable 
from the conjuga l act. Conception in vitro is immoral because it is "the 
result of technical action which pres ides over fertilization. Such 
fertili zation is neither in fact ac hieved nor positively willed as the 
express ion and fruit of a specific ac t of conjuga l union."g This statement 
points to the bas ic reason why IY F is wrong. It replaces the conjugal act, 
the only proper context for procreation, with a technica l procedure. Thus, 
of its nature, IYF differs from other techniques which assist fertilization. 
Donum Vitae explicitly makes thi s di stinction: " If the technical means 
fac ilitates the conjugal act or helps it to reach its natural objectives, it can 
be mora lly acceptable. If, on the other hand. the procedure were to replace 
the conjugal act, it is morally illici t: '!) 
In isolating procreation from conjugal union, IY F transfers the 
ca usa lity of conception to the hands of tec hnicians. Thi s di storts not only 
the proper ro le of sexuality but al so the proper ro le of the phys ician, who is 
then invested with power over life and death. "The doctor is at the service 
of persons and of human procreation. He does not have the authority to 
dispose of them and to dec ide their fa te:" o 
Dvnum Vitae has more strong words fo r the process of hetero logous 
artific ial fertilization, in which embryos are conce ived by the use of 
gametes from at least one person other than the spouses: "The fidelity of 
the spouses in the uni ty of marriage invo lves rec iprocal respect of their 
right to become a father and a mother only th rough each other.'· " The 
Congregation in sists that hetero logous art i fic ial ferti I ization is detrimental 
to the child, who "can di scover hi s own identity and ac hieve hi s own proper 
human deve lopment : only th rough a "sec ure and recogni zed relati onship to 
hi s own parents. ,, 12 
Cataldo outlines two currents of contemporary thought which 
dominate cultural views of IYF: personal autonomy and emotiv ism. He 
li sts several ethica l think tanks which appea l primar ily to the princ iple of 
autonomy in making mora l determinations about reproducti ve technologies, 
inc luding the Canadian Roya l Commiss ion on New Reproductive 
Techno logies, Thc Dani sh Council on Ethics. the U.S. Congress Office of 
Tec hno logy Assessment, and the American Fertility Soc iety. According to 
the personal autonomy mindset, one is free to make hi s or her own ethi cal 
determination of these procedures and to use whatever seems appropriate. 
Any norms that would discount reprod ucti ve technologies place a limit on 
pe rso n a I freed 0 m. 
The other strai n of contempora ry thought hi ghlighted by Cata ldo is 
emoti vism. A good example of an emoti vist presentation of IYF is a maj or 
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periodical ' s recent account of the birth of quadruplets to a 48 year-old 
woman using her 28 year-old sister's donated egg cells. The overjoyed 
mother views the future of the quads optimistically: "They' re going to grow 
up in a caring environment with two parents who love them, not to mention 
one wonderful aunt." I) Not surprisingly, no mention is made of any 
arguments against IYF, nor the ambiguity of which woman is the loving 
mother and which is the wonderful aunt. 
More serious argumentation in favor of IVF from within the field of 
moral theology goes beyond personal autonomy and emotivism. Any case 
made in favor of IVF must accomplish two things: I) it must disavow the 
necessary connection between procreation and the conjugal act; and 2) it 
must provide a rationale for creating and destroying the "spare" embryos 
that IVF requires for success. 
Some theologians attempt to accomplish the first of these aims by 
reference to the principle of totality. They admit that there must be some 
connection between procreation and marital union, but deny that each and 
every instance of procreation must take place within the context of a 
conjugal act. For example, Li sa Cahill remarks, " In homologous 
techniques, the physical relationship of sexual intimacy, and the biological 
relationship of parenthood are both preserved within the marital relation of 
the couple.,,14 Cahill shares the mistake of some defenders of the 
"fundamental option" theory by assuming that an association between the 
conjugal act and procreation can exist on a transcendental level, i.e., on the 
level of "relationship" rather than particular acts. On the contrary, actions 
speak louder than words . Any recognition by the couple of the link 
between conjugal union and procreation must be spoken with actions that 
do not separate the two. 
Objective #2 above is usually accompli shed by questioning the 
personhood of the early embryo. Currently, such arguments use certain 
fact s of developmental biology ill an effort to show that a newly conceived 
human zygote is not, or is probably not, suitable material for a principle of 
personhood, i.e., a soul. Among theologians who hold this position are 
Norman Ford,15 Thomas Shannon, III and Richard McCormick.17 
How do these theologians assail the personhood of the early embryo? 
One way is by questioning the early embryo ' s individuality . According to 
these authors, the early embryo is in some ways more like a collection of 
cell s than an individual human being. This is evidenced by the fact that 
each of the cells of the early embryo is totipotent, or able to develop into a 
new embryo if it becomes separated from the rest of the cell mass. Such 
separation occurs naturally ill at least one-fourth of one percent of 
pregnancies, resulting in multiple births. IS 
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Because of the questionable stability of the early embryo, Ford, 
Shannon, and McCormick draw a distinction between the kind of 
individuality that the early embryo possesses and the sort possessed by the 
later embryo or adult . According to McCormick, the zygote possesses 
"genetic individuality" from fertilization . In other words, it contains a 
unique genetic code different from each parent and from anyone else who 
has ever existed . However, as long as the embryo's cells are totipotent, it 
has not yet attained "developmental individuality," i.e. , it is not yet 
determined to produce one and only one human being. 19 
Is developmental individuality necessary for personhood? 
McConnick answers affirmatively, because incommunicability is a defining 
note of personhood. I f a single embryo is capable of developing into twins, 
how can the original embryo be held to possess an incommunicable 
principle of personhood, i.e., a soul? 
Such arguments against the personhood of the embryo are far from 
unassailable. The movement from the premise that the early embryo can 
twin to the conclusion that the embryo cannot be a person is rather swift. 
Ashley suggests an alternative scenario by which an embryo that gives rise 
to twins could nonetheless be a person: the newly-formed twin receives a 
soul upon separation from the embryo.2o Moraczewski suggests as less 
likely another hypothesis: the original zygote effectively dies, giving rise to 
two new individuals. 21 
The position of McCormick, Shannon. and others can also be 
critiqued on the level of biology. There are many cases in nature in which 
one individual of a species divides to form two individuals, yet no one 
seriously denies that the original individual was fully an individual. Also, 
if the embryo is really a collection of cells lacking stability, what accounts 
for the fact that twinning does not occur 99% of the time? 
In the end, scientific data are necessary but not sufficient to answer 
the question of the early embryo ' s personhood. Certainty regarding the 
personal dignity of the early embryo can be derived only from the 
awareness that " the gift of truth" has been entrusted to the teaching Church. 
However, the foregoing should be sufficient to illustrate that the 
personhood of the early embryo is rationally defensible despite current 
claims to the contrary. 
Some Odd Consequences 
Part of the difficulty involved in driving home the immorality of IYF 
involves the consequentialist climate in which moral decisions are often 
made. As a previously cited example illustrates, the popular media often 
depicts happy outcomes of IYF without reference to its bad consequences, 
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leaving many wondering what harm there could possi bly be in the 
procedure. Without capitulating to consequential ism, it is worthwhile to 
examine some of these harmful effects, since bad effects are always the 
fruit of bad actions. What are some consequences of IYF other than those 
usually mentioned? 
The first to be considered is the killing and miscarriage of "spare" 
embryos. Typically, technicians attempt to fertilize 12 eggs and implant 
four of them. Other viable embryos are then frozen , killed, or used for 
research. As an example, M.M . Bodin relates that after hyperstimulation of 
her ovaries, an infertility clinic harvested 15 eggs. Upon fertilization in 
vitro with her husband ' s sperm, doctors informed her that they had 
produced II viable embryos. They transferred six of the embryos to 
Bodin ' s uterus and froze the other five , but all s ix of the transferred 
embryos died. The five frozen embryos were then thawed for a second 
attempt, but only two of these survived the thawing process and these also 
failed to implant. 
Two years later Bodin made another attempt at IYF. This try was 
"successful" and she gave birth nine months later. Technicians also froze 
18 spare embryos from this attempt. Approximately one year later she felt 
ready for another pregnancy, so she had 12 of these 18 embryos thawed . 
Six were killed during the thawing process, and doctors transferred the 
other six to her womb, resulting in the birth oftwins. 22 
Thus, in giving birth to her three children, the " side effect" was 21 
dead embryos, not counting the six that are still frozen , and any others that 
never made it out of the petri dish. 
As Donum Vitae remarks, "From the moment of conception the life of 
every human being is to be respected in an absolute way." Descriptions 
such as Bodin ' s make it clear that far from being respected absolutely, the 
embryos produced by IYF are valued only as a pool from which desirable 
candidates for reinsertion will be se lected . And the phenomenon of spare 
embryos is not likely to go away, since each attempt at IYF is physically 
and emotionally trying for the woman, as well as expensive. 
As might be expected, the killing of spare embryos is not taken 
seriously in descriptions of IYF. A recent Time magazine photo caption is 
typical: "Doctors have countered a virtual epidemic of infertility with new 
treatments, including the injection of sperm into eggs . .. The result: healthy 
fetuses like the four-month old one at left - and thousands of proud 
parents. ,,23 
That all of this has resu lted in a general cheapening of human life is 
not surprising either. Those who use IYF seem unable to recognize any 
inherent values in their embryos outside of the trouble they have gone 
through to have them created. As one IYF client ponders the fate of her six 
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frozen frozen embryos, she remarks, " After all we ' ve gone through, the 
concept of destroying the embryos is hard to imagine. So we pay our $50 a 
month storage fee, raise o ur boys and wonder what we are going to dO.,,24 
With heterologous artificial fertilization , additional problems can 
appear. A good example is Jaycee Buzzanca, a California two-year old 
who was legally parentless, despite the fact that six different people could 
reasonably claim to be her parents. In 1994, John and Luanne Buzzanca 
arranged for IVF with anonymous sperm and egg donors. The embryo was 
implanted in the womb of a married surrogate mother. Shortly before 
Jaycee was bo rn , John Buzzanca fil ed for divorce. In the meantime, the 
surrogate mother decided to seek custody of the child, but later withdrew 
her claim. It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of the ignorance of 
Donum Vitae's warning: "The child is not an object to which one has a 
right, nor can he be considered as an object of ownership: rather, a child is 
a g ift. ,,25 
In such cases of heterologous artificial fertili zat ion, the eugenic nature 
of IYF is seen even more clearly. To facilitate egg donation, egg banks 
prov ide files on prospecti ve donors, potential rec ipients can se lect the one 
who appears most like ly to y ie ld hea lthy, attractive, and otherw ise desirable 
offspring. Donors with more des irable traits can receive a higher fee for 
their eggs. 
Bad effec ts on parents a re a lso be ing not iced . Jean Benward, a 
psycholog ist who spec ializes in infe rtility cou nse ling, notes that pa rents a re 
often di stressed when they see the features of another woman on the ir 
baby ' s face. Some di scover that they think about the egg donor long after 
the baby arrives. Others, says Benward, are haunted by fantas ies abo ut 
their Own biological offspring that w ill never be born. Gi na Grammatico, a 
23 year-o ld egg donor, remarks, "I didn ' t know w hat I was getti ng into. 
Just wondering what the child looks like is go ing to bug me for the rest of 
my life. ,,26 T hese diffi culties may be more common than many rea li ze: in 
1994, 1,240 bab ies were born from donated eggs in the US alone. 27 And if 
the adults who opt for these procedures a re encountering untoward 
conseque nces, what w ill the futures o f the ir children ho ld? 
Conclusion 
At present , there is little indi catio n that the tide of reproduct ive 
manipUlati on wi ll be stemmed . In a new proced ure, e igh t births have now 
been reported after fertilization of prev ious ly frozen eggs (as opposed to 
the frozen embrvos no rmally used in IVf) . If thi s tec hno logy is perfected 
(perhaps in a decade or so), young women will be ab le to have their eggs 
removed and frozen, pursue a career, and then have a c hild at w hatever age 
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they decide to fit it into their schedule. Menopause will no longer mean the 
end of childbearing. In fact, with standard egg donation, approximately 
100 women over age 50 have already given birth, including a 63 year-old 
American woman and a 62 year-old Italian.28 As John Paris, S.1., remarks 
in regard to these post-menopausal births, "We're designing orphans by 
choice, and we say this is O.K. ,,29 
Of course, the immorality of IVF does not derive solely or even 
primarily from such consequences. IVF usurps God ' s authority over the 
creation of human life by removing it from the context of the conjugal act. 
However, the growing circus of reproductive technologies should serve as a 
reminder of what human beings find it rather difficult to learn : when we 
ignore divine wisdom, we do so to our own peril. 
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